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ABATING AN IMMINENT HAZARD: INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE,
COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980
[T]he principle of 'innocent until proven guilty' applies to persons and not
to chemicals. Chemical substances should be judged guilty until proven
innocent, with the burden of proof on the chemical and the benefit of the
doubt extended to the people."
INTRODUCTION
The production of synthetic chemical substances ranging from
pesticides to plastics has brought with it the accumulation of mas-
sive amounts of toxic waste.2 These substances, unavoidable by-
products of the modern chemical manufacturing process, are either
known to cause or suspected of causing a host of serious medical
ailments.' Disposing of this hazardous waste is a problem currently
vexing both the business community and legislative policy makers.
Unfortunately, no safe and effective method of disposal accompa-
nied the appearance of these toxic compounds.4 Rather, chemical
1. New Jersey State Senate Commission on the Incidence of Cancer, quoted in M.
BROWN, LAYING WASTE: THE POISONING OF AMERICA BY Toxic WASTE 138 (1980).
2. It has been estimated that as much as 255 to 275 million metric tons of hazardous
waste is generated in the United States per year. This represents a ratio of about one ton of
hazardous waste produced for every person in the United States. N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1983,
at B14, col. 1 (recounting statistics reported in OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECH-
NOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL (1983)).
3. See SuBcOMmrrrEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., HAZARDOUS WAsTE DIsPosAL 15 (Comm.
Print 1979) (medical problems associated with Love Canal included increased rates of mis-
carriage and birth defects, central nervous system disorders, nervous breakdowns, hyperac-
tivity, epilepsy, urinary disease, and respiratory problems) [hereinafter SuBCOMM. ON
OVERSIGHT].
4. Much of the hazardous waste produced in the United States has been deposited in
landfills and other surface impoundments. See infra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
Often these depositories leak and contaminate groundwater. See Cameron, Hope for a Less
Toxic Future, 100 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 747, 748 (1983). See also Highland, Hazardous
Waste: What Is Proper Waste Disposal?, 241 CURRENT 16, 18-19 (1982). The National
Academy of Sciences has issued a report, "Management of Hazardous Industrial Wastes," in
which the academy concludes that the use of even modern landfills should be minimized
because many toxic chemicals remain hazardous for centuries and it is impossible to prevent
migration of chemicals into groundwater. N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1983, at B14, col. 1.
Scientists believe, however, that technologies already exist which are capable of either
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waste usually has been simply dumped, either directly or in tanks,
into landfills. These sites, which often provide no structures to trap
the chemical waste, justifiably have become the focus of significant
concern.
Over the last decade, Congress has attempted to legislate a
program by which chemical waste will be tracked and regulated
from its inception through its disposal,5 but until recently environ-
mental protection laws contained no provisions addressing
problems caused by past hazardous waste disposal. Finally, in
1980, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA)6 was enacted to provide a solution to
the problem of cleaning up toxic sites. The statute, commonly re-
ferred to as the Superfund Act, provides a mechanism by which
the federal government pays for the removal and relocation of dan-
gerous chemical waste; the costs of the cleanup are then recovered
from those determined to be responsible parties. Use of
Superfund monies, however, is contingent upon state cooperation
and other factors possibly beyond the control of the federal gov-
ernment.8 Thus, dangerous sites may exist which cannot be cle-
aned up by use of the Superfund.
When a toxic waste disposal site presents an imminent hazard,
however, CERCLA provides an alternate remedy to that of using
Superfund monies. The imminent hazard provision, section 106(a),
authorizes the United States Attorney General to secure such relief
as may be necessary to abate an "imminent and substantial endan-
germent to the public health ... because of an actual or
containing or eliminating every hazardous waste in a manner that eliminates the need for
perpetual storage. Id. Alternatives include changes in industrial processes so as to reduce
the generation of waste; recovery and recycling of waste materials for use in other products;
incineration on land or at sea; physical, chemical and biological treatments to reduce the
volume or toxicity' of chemical waste; and injection of toxic waste into deepwells. N.Y.
Times, Mar. 16, 1983, at A20, coLl. The costs of these treatments, however, are far greater
than for landfills. Congress is Narrowing the Choices on Toxic Wastes, Business Week, July
4, 1983, at 36.
5. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976),
amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901a, 6911a, 6914a, 6932, 6933, 6934, 6941a, 6955, 6956 (Supp. IV
1980).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. IV 1980).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9607(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). See infra note 54 and accompany-
ing text.
8. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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threatened release of a hazardous substance. . .. "I Modeled after
other environmental imminent hazard statutes, 10 section 106(a)
provides authority for district courts to grant such relief "as the
public interest and the equities of the case require."'1 The Justice
Department contends that this section provides a mechanism by
which parties responsible for the imminent danger, though not ac-
tually present owners of the dump site, may be ordered by
mandatory injunction to clean up the substances causing the
hazard. 2
This Comment will consider the use of section 106(a) as a
mechanism for abating such imminent hazards. In several actions
brought under section 106(a), the federal government has re-
quested that mandatory injunctions be granted against generators
of hazardous waste. i3 These requested injunctions, which if
granted would order generators to abate the hazard, in practice
would require enjoined parties to reimburse the government for
costs incurred or to be incurred in planning and implementing a
site cleanup.
This Comment focuses upon two problems present in pursuing
such an injunction. One problem which occurs when attempting to
9. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
10. Other imminent hazard and emergency provisions in environmental response stat-
utes include: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 7003, 42 U.S.C. § 6973
(Supp. IV 1980); Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 504, 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (Supp. IV
1980); Clean Air Act § 302(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7603 (Supp. IV 1980); Safe Drinking Water Act §
1431, 42 U.S.C. § 300(i) (1976); and Toxic Substances Control Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 2606
(1976), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (Supp. IV 1980). For an explanation of the provisions
of these sections, see Note, Inactive or Abandoned Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites: Cop-
ing With a Costly Past, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1709, 1722-26 (1980).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
12. See Guidelines for Using the Imminent Hazard Enforcement and Emergency Re-
sponse Authorities of Superfund and Other Statutes, 47 Fed. Reg. 20,664-65 (1982).
13. The federal government requested an injunction in United States v. Wade, 546 F.
Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982), appeal dismissed, 713 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v.
Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982); United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556
F. Supp. 54 (N.D. IM. 1982); United States v. Hardage, No. Civ-80-1031-W (W.D. Okla. Dec.
13, 1982) (unpublished).
On November 3, 1983, the government filed a notice of appeal from the initial Wade
decision. The appellees filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. United
States v. Wade, 713 F.2d 49, 52 (3d Cir. 1983). The government appeal was brought pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980), which states that the court of appeals has
jurisdiction of appeals from: "(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United
States . . . refusing or dissolving injunctions .... " The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that the government had not made a showing sufficient to warrant an appeal
under § 1292(a)(1).
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use an injunction to rectify the danger of toxic waste release arises
from the very precepts of equity itself. Because of the common law
limitation that injunctions are to be granted only where an irrepa-
rable harm may exist absent its issuance,14 use of section 106(a)
has been questioned since alternate cleanup mechanisms are avail-
able under the Superfund. Thus, it has been argued that an ade-
quate remedy at law exists and that section 106(a) cannot be used
to enjoin those responsible to pay for a cleanup.1 Additionally, be-
cause it is an equitable action, an injunction which provides for the
payment of money has been questioned as being analogous to a
remedy at law.
A second difficulty in securing a section 106(a) injunction fol-
lows from the ambiguity of the statute itself; the section does not
specify to whom it may be directed. While the imminent hazard
section does provide for securing such relief as may be necessary,
there is no mention of the possible defendants to such an action.
Thus, a question arises whether the statute was intended to be
used against all those deemed responsible parties for other pur-
poses of the Act,1" or whether the injunction provision is only ap-
plicable to the last in the chain of waste disposal-the site owner.
This Comment will demonstrate that section 106(a) was in-
tended to provide for the use of injunctions regardless of the avail-
ability of Superfund monies to provide for a cleanup, and that sec-
tion 106(a) is available for use against all those deemed potentially
liable under the Act. Consideration of antecedent environmental
legislation as well as the factual setting which led to the statute's
passage will be discussed to provide insight into the purposes for
which CERCLA was enacted. A discussion of the statutory lan-
guage and the interaction of the statute's various sections will then
be undertaken to demonstrate that these sections of the Act
should be given a broad interpretation. Finally, consideration of
the recent case law construing CERCLA as well as case law con-
cerning the use of mandatory injunctions will provide the basis for
the interpretation that the adequate remedy at law limitation does
not bar the use of CERCLA section 106(a), and that the section
14. See infra notes 133-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of irreparable harm
and the common law adequate remedy at law restriction.
15. Wade, 546 F. Supp. at 794.
16. Potentially liable parties are defined in CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp.
IV 1980).
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was intended to be both broadly construed and readily available as
a weapon against all parties responsible for the hazards which toxic
waste pose.
I. POLICIES AND PURPOSES OF CERCLA
A. The Setting for the Statute's Enactment: The National Haz-
ardous Waste Problem and Lessons from Past Congressional
Efforts
When considering the proper construction of section 106(a), a
review of the circumstances leading to the statute's enactment is
particularly revealing. In 1979 and 1980, the problem of hazardous
waste disposal was brought to the forefront of public attention by
media coverage of the much publicized catastrophe at the Love Ca-
nal in Niagara Falls, New York.17 It became apparent to both the
general public and Congress that the dimensions of the national
hazardous waste problem were staggering: approximately ten to
fifteen percent of the fifty-seven million tons of industrial waste
17. Work on the Love Canal commenced in the late nineteenth century by William T.
Love. He undertook the project for the purpose of creating a navigable power channel. The
project was never completed and was left as a mile long trench ten to forty feet deep and
approximately fifteen yards wide. M. BROWN, supra note 1, at 7-8. Hooker Electrochemical
Corporation, later known as Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corporation, purchased the site
in 1947 and by 1953 had disposed of approximately eighty deadly chemicals at the site. 126
CONG. REC. 30,937 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Daniel Moynihan) (recounting the chronology of
events that followed the discovery of hazardous substances in the Love Canal area in mid-
1977). See also 126 CONG. REc. at 30,942 (1980) (remarks of Sen. George Mitchell) (recount-
ing one Love Canal resident's testimony as to the health problems which developed in the
area).
Among these buried chemicals were benzene and dioxin. The chemical 2,3,7,8 - TCDD, a
dioxin isomer, has been described as "perhaps the most poisonous synthetic chemical." Tril-
ling, Painstaking Negotiation Leads to Landmark Court Order Approving Settlement
Agreement in Hyde Park Hazardous Waste Cleanup Litigation, 12 EvrL. L. REP. (ENvTL.
L. INST.) 15,013 n.5 (1982), citing M. EsposiTo, T. TIERNANI & F. DRYDEN, DiOXINS 187 (Cin-
cinnati, Nov. 1980) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Industrial Environmental Re-
search Laboratory). The site was purchased by the Niagara County Board of Education for
an elementary school; private homes also were built on the property. 126 CONG. REc. 30,937
(1980). In 1978, reports of birth defects, miscarriages, liver abnormalities, sores, rectal bleed-
ing, and headaches led the New York State Department of Health to investigate the Love
Canal situation. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1980), citing Brown, Love Canal,
USA, in N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1979 (Magazine), at 23. Eventually, the State Health Commis-
sioner declared a state of emergency within a two block area around the canal site. 126
CONG. REc. 30,937 (1980). In August, 1978, New York Governor Hugh Carey announced that
the state would evacuate 236 families; this announcement came immediately after President
Jimmy Carter declared a state of emergency for the area. Id. at 30,938.
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produced per year in the United States is hazardous.18 Estimates
of the amount of this toxic waste improperly disposed of run as
high as ninety percent.19 Much of this material is dumped at sites
not authorized to contain hazardous substances,20 and in fact even
the refuse disposed of in authorized hazardous waste depositories
represents a health threat.2
Experts have estimated that approximately 1,200 to 2,000 of
the 30,000 to 50,000 waste disposal sites in the United States pose
a potential threat to the public health.22 Compounding the prob-
lem is the fact that hazardous waste disposal sites are located close
to major population centers2 3 as well as adjacent to water supply
sources for many urban communities.24 Also, many closed disposal
sites are subsequently used for other purposes. 25 Indeed, known
disposal sites have been used for residences, private farms, parking
lots, cemeteries, botanical gardens and nurseries.2"
Facts and figures alone failed to illustrate the tragedy result-
ing from the unsafe practices of the past. With increasing fre-
quency, the public became aware of the health cost associated with
living near a hazardous waste disposal site. By the time CERCLA
18. See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal: Joint Hearings Before the Sub-
comms. on Envtl. Pollution and Resource Protection of the Senate Comm. on Env't and
Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, 82 (1979) (statement of EPA Assistant Adminis-
trator Thomas C. Jorling) (illegal spraying of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) along 210
miles of roadway in North Carolina); id. at 84 (haphazard storage, including illicit dumping
and improper storage accounts for approximately half the hazardous waste problem) [here-
inafter Hazardous Waste Hearings pt. 1]. See also SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT, supra note 3,
at 10 (illegal dumping in Kentucky).
21. Hazardous Waste Hearings pt. 1, supra note 20, at 83 (statement of Thomas C.
Jorling).
22. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT, supra note 3, at 87 (statement of Thomas C. Jorling citing
data from a survey conducted by Fred Hart and Co.). But see id. at 23 (suggesting that the
Hart survey is speculative and not scientifically relevant).
23. Among the areas discussed in the legislative history are populated communities in
New Jersey and Michigan. See Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal: Joint Hearings
Before the Subcomms. on Envtl. Pollution and Resource Protection of the Senate Comm.
on Env't and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 4, 217-40, 246-50 (1980) [hereinafter
Hazardous Waste Hearings pt. 4].
24. See The Poisoning of America, Time, Sept. 22, 1980, at 58, 60.
25. For example, the Love Canal was sold by Hooker Chemical to the Niagara Falls
School Board which used the property as the site of an elementary school. Trilling, supra
note 17, at 15,013.
26. 10 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1497 (1979).
27. An ABC News-Harris Poll conducted after news of Love Canal was first publicized
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was considered, the name Love Canal had become synonymous
with the health concerns associated with these sites;2 s numerous
other incidents of disposal site health disasters were documented
as well.29 The public outcry following the discovery of the "Love
Canals" throughout the United States prompted the ninety-sixth
Congress to enact CERCLA in 1980.
CERCLA was not the first attempt made by Congress to regu-
late hazardous waste production and disposal through environmen-
tal legislation. Prior to the enactment of CERCLA, however, legis-
lative attempts to protect the public from the dangers of toxic
disposal sites were, at best, fragmented. Emergency powers provi-
sions, which include authorization to bring civil actions for equita-
ble relief from an imminent and substantial endangerment,30 have
been an integral part of many environmental protection statutes.
These statutes, however, are of limited scope, and as a conse-
quence are only marginally effective. For example, the Solid Waste
Disposal Act of 1965 provided assistance to local governments only
in the regulation of open dumpsites.31 Other acts treated hazardous
substance disposal only as an incident to general regulation of air
or water quality. 2 In 1970, Congress enacted the Resource Recov-
found that 76% of those surveyed considered toxic chemical dumping to be a very serious
problem. The Poisoning of America, supra note 24, at 63.
The health costs of living near a hazardous chemical waste site include both physical and
mental illness. See Love Canal Residents Under Stress, 208 SCIENCE 1242 (1980); Neighbor-
hood of Fear, Time, June 2, 1980, at 61; Our Fear Never Ends, McCall's, June 1980, at 94.
28. Indeed, in the Readers Guide to Periodical Literature issues for March 1979
through February 1980, all articles under the classification of "Pollution-NY" concerned
the Love Canal. The Love Canal later became a separate listing.
29. These deposit sites can be found throughout the country in both rural and urban
areas. See M. BROWN, supra note 1, at 99-225. See also The Poisoning of America, supra
note 24, at 61.
30. For example, temporary restraining orders have been given under § 303 of the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act in United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 71-1041 (S.D.
Ala. filed Nov. 18, 1971); § 504 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act in State Water
Control Bd. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm., No. 1813-73 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 6,
1974); and § 1431(a) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act in United States v. FMC Corp., No 77-
3061 (S.D.W. Va. filed Mar. 9, 1977). See Skaff, The Emergency Powers in the Environmen-
tal Protection Statutes: A Suggestion for a Unified Emergency Provision, 3 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 298, 306-11 (1979).
31. Dore, The Standard of Civil Liability for Hazardous Waste Disposal Activity:
Some Quirks of Superfund, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 260, 264 (1981).
32. For example, the dumping of hazardous wastes into navigable waters is regulated by
the Clean Water Act. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, § 1321, 33 U.S.C. 1321
(Supp. IV 1980) (oiland hazardous substance liability). It has been suggested that the Clean
Air Act's emergency powers provisions might also be used against hazards resulting from
1983]
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ery Act 33 which expanded the federal role slightly by authorizing
grants for the construction of facilites which would recover usable
waste materials, but until 1976 no statute specifically focused on
the problem of hazardous waste disposal.
Recognizing the magnitude of the threat, Congress enacted the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) in 1976.31 But
while RCRA provides for "cradle to grave"35 control of hazardous
wastes to ensure adequate disposal practices, it only applies to the
generation and disposal of present and future hazardous waste."
Release of toxic material generated in the past and disposed of at
sites which are now inactive or abandoned was not addressed
under RCRA.37  Herein lies the gap which section 106(a) of
CERCLA was designed to fill. While both statutes contain an im-
minent hazard provision,38 RCRA is confined to the dangers posed
by waste disposal."9 In contrast, CERCLA was enacted to address
waste releases into the air. See Note, supra note 10, at 1725.
33. Pub. L. No. 91-512, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251-3254(f), 3256-3259
(1970) (omitted in the general amendment of the Solid Waste Disposal Act by Pub. L. No.
94-580, § 2, 90 Stat. 95 (1976)).
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (Supp. IV 1980).
35. One commentator has explained the view that the RCRA provides "cradle to grave"
control as such:
The RCRA directs the EPA to identify types, quantities, and concentrations of
hazardous wastes. The RCRA also requires the EPA to establish minimum stan-
dards applicable to all who generate, transport, treat, store, or dispose of hazard-
ous wastes. States are authorized to adopt, administer, and enforce their own
standards in lieu of the minimum federal standards, if the EPA determines that
the state standards are equivalent or superior to the federal standards, as well as
consistent with standards in neighboring states. Under either federal or state
standards, permits are required for the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazard-
ous wastes. The Act authorizes government inspections and the issuance of com-
pliance orders to aid enforcement. Also, the Act authorizes citizens to sue for
injunctions and for recovery of the costs of litigation.
Note, supra note 10, at 1716.
36. See Hazardous Waste Hearings pt. 4, supra note 23, at 1 (statement of Sen. John
Culver). See also RCRA Authorization Hearings before the Subcomm. on Transportation
and Commerce of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 9, 11 (1979) (statement of Rep. John LaFalce).
37. SuBcoMM. ON OVERSIGHT, supra note 3, at 47-50.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. IV 1980). CERCLA's imminent hazard provision appears at
42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
39. RCRA § 7003 states that:
upon receipt of evidence that the handling, storage, treatment, transportation or
disposal of any. . .hazardous waste may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment, the Administrator may bring suit
on behalf of the United States in the appropriate district court to immediately
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the hazards presented by waste release,40 which includes materials
escaping both from waste presently produced and improperly
stored and from waste produced in years past and disposed of in a
careless manner. It was the recognition of RCRA's limitations that
led to the creation of CERCLA section 106(a). The scope of the
imminent hazard provision indicates that it was drafted broadly to
allow greater coverage than had been provided previously by simi-
lar provisions.
B. Legislative History and Statutory Language of
CERCLA-Congressional Intent
When Congress became aware of the tremendous health
problems resulting from the careless disposal of hazardous waste, it
attempted to provide legislation which would address the dangers
of toxic waste release and allocate the liability for the harm to
those responsible. It was clear that past environmental initiatives
had created disharmonious actions where loopholes and red tape
were prevalent. Accordingly, Congress enacted CERCLA in an at-
tempt to provide a new statute which would both complement
other environmental laws and provide for comprehensive regula-
tion to cover a wide range of situations arising when disposed haz-
ardous waste threatened to create a health problem. At the same
time, however, it cannot be denied that the Act represents a com-
promise.41 While Congress attempted to draft a comprehensive bill,
the political realities of enacting legislation in the waning days of a
restrain any person contributing to such handling, storage, treatment, transpor-
tation or disposal to stop such handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or
disposal or to take such other action as may be necessary.
Id.
40. Release is defined in CERCLA § 101(22) as:
[S]pilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting,
escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment, but excludes (A)
any release which results in exposure to persons solely within a workplace, with
respect to a claim which such persons may assert against the employer of such
persons, (B) emissions from the engine exhaust ... (C) release of source, by-
product, or special nuclear material from a nuclear incident. . .(D) the normal
application of fertilizer.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (Supp. IV 1980).
41. See generally Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. LAW
1 (1982).
1983]
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lame duck Congress4 necessitated numerous concessions to ensure
the Act's ratification. 3
It is significant that despite the dilution of the statute's liabil-
ity sections, the imminent hazard provision emerged unscathed. In
fact, the lack of discussion regarding the use of section 106(a) is
striking. Concerned that delay would result in further weakening
of the Act, the Democratic sponsors of CERCLA along with House
and Senate Republican leaders produced a compromise statute
which was then presented to the Congress with only limited de-
bate.44 The resulting legislative history therefore is equivocal.4"
However, since interpretations of all ambiguous statutes focus
upon congressional intent,46 detailed consideration of the legisla-
tive history is still useful.
1. Liability of responsible parties. The lengthy congressional
hearings on waste disposal disasters47 which preceded the enact-
ment of CERCLA illustrated that the scope of the hazardous waste
problem was enormous; consideration of the proper allocation of
the costs of site cleanup thus was a primary focus of this legisla-
42. Id. at 35. The bill was presented to President Jimmy Carter on December 1, 1980,
only weeks before the inauguration of President Ronald Reagan. Id.
43. The compromise legislation deleted many of the provisions of the original bill in-
cluding joint and several liability, a federal cause of action for medical expenses or property
or income loss, and special medical causation provisions. See Grad, supra note 41, at 21-22.
44. In the House of Representatives, Congressman James Florio moved to suspend the
rules of the House. Accordingly, the bill could only be passed in the form in which it was
brought to the House floor and there was only limited debate. This parliamentary device
was utilized by design because of the fragile nature of the compromise, which had been
worked out by the two political parties. See 126 CONG. REc. 31,950 (1980). See also Grad,
supra note 41, at 29-30.
45. The legislative history of CERCLA is voluminous. An early version of the Act was
considered and passed by the House of Representatives on September 20, 1980. A somewhat
different bill subsequently was considered and passed by the Senate in lieu of the House-
passed bill. On December 3, 1980, the House concurred in the Senate amendments. See
generally Grad, supra note 41, for a description of the progress of the legislation through
the House and Senate.
46. See Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 13
(1981) (noting that "[t]he key to [an] inquiry is the intent of the Legislature. We look first,
of course, to the statutory language . . . [t]hen we review the legislative history and other
traditional aids of statutory interpretation to determine congressional intent"). See also
Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981); California v. Sierra
Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770
(1980); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979); Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1978).
47. See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980).
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tion.48 A major policy objective of the Act was to place the costs of
handling hazardous wastes upon those generating the waste prod-
ucts as well as upon site owners and those responsible for trans-
porting waste. Members of Congress expressed justifications rang-
ing from cost effectiveness to deterrence and simple notions of
justice as rationales for the decision to make all these parties re-
sponsible for cleanup costs. 49 For example, the logic of holding gen-
erators liable was expressed by Thomas Jorling, Assistant Admin-
istrator for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), who
stated at Senate hearings that "[w]e have, in effect, adopted a
rather ancient common law principle that someone who puts into
existence a very hazardous substance can not insulate himself from
the consequences. "50
Congress' intent to hold generators liable was clearly codified
in the Superfund Act. The Act allocates costs to generators in two
ways. Generators are taxed on a per ton basis for the chemical
waste they produce;51 this tax money is incorporated into the
Superfund52 to be used to pay for the hazardous waste cleanup
under the provisions of the general response mechanism, section
104.11 Payment of this tax, however, does not protect generators
48. Throughout the legislative history there are indications that generators should be
liable under a strict liability standard, and this desire led to enactment of the liability provi-
sions of section 107. See Grad, supra note 41, at 9, 21-22.
49. See S. REP. No. 848, supra note 47, at 33 (analogizing generators' liability to that
imposed on manufacturers in ultrahazardous activity cases, and discussing policy considera-
tions). The report contends that
society should not bear the costs of protecting the public from hazards produced
in the past by a generator, transporter, consumer, or dumpsite owner or operator
who has profited or otherwise benefited from commerce involving these sub-
stances and now wishes to be insulated from any continuing responsibilities for
the present hazards to society that have been created. . .. Relieving industry of
responsibility establishes a precedent seriously adverse to the public interest.
Id. at 98. See also 126 CONG. REC. 30,933 (1980); id. at 30,971; id. at 30,939 (remarks of Sen.
Paul Tsongas); id. at 30,939-40 (remarks of Sen. Bill Bradley); id. at 31,978 (remarks of Rep.
James Jeffords).
50. Hazardous Waste Hearings pt. 4, supra note 23, at 30.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (Supp. IV 1980); 126 CONG. REc. 30,932 (1980).
52. I.R.C. §§ 4611, 4612, 4661, 4662, and 4882 (Supp. IV 1980).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (Supp. IV 1980). Section 104(a)(1) states:
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial
threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or sub-
stantial threat of release into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant
which may present an imminent and substantial danger. . . , the President is
authorized to act ... to remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for
remedial action relating to such hazardous substance ... which the President
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from further liability. Under section 107 of the Act, 4 generators as
a class are specifically defined as potentially liable for the neces-
sary costs of response to a waste depository hazard, including any
removal 5 and remedial action,56 as well as damages for injury, de-
struction, or loss of natural resources. By including generators,
past and present site owners, and hazardous waste transporters as
potentially liable parties under section 107, the drafters of
CERCLA attempted to assure that the government would be able
to secure the money necessary for toxic waste cleanup from all
those responsible for the dangerous conditions.
The policy objective of allocating the cost of necessary re-
moval and remedial action to those responsible for the dangerous
condition is clearly illustrated throughout CERCLA's legislative
history. While section 106(a) does not define explicitly toward
whom the imminent hazard provision is aimed, the construction
most consistent with the legislative history is that the statute sec-
tion should be used in conjunction with section 107. The language
of section 107 does not limit the instances to which it is applica-
deems necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the environment, un-
less the President determines that such. . . action will be done properly by the
owner or operator. . . or by any other responsible party.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
55. Removal is defined as:
[Tihe cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environ-
ment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat of re-
lease of hazardous substances into the environment, such actions as may be nec-
essary to monitor, assess and evaluate the release or threat of release of
hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such
other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to
the public health or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result
from a release or threat of release. The term includes, in addition without being
limited to, security fencing or other measures to limit access, provision of alter-
native water supplies, temporary evacuation and housing of threatened individu-
als not otherwise provided for, action taken under section 9604(b) of this title,
and any emergency assistance which may be provided under the Disaster Relief
Act of 1974.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (Supp. IV 1980).
56. Remedy or remedial action is defined as:
[Tihose actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addi-
tion to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a haz-
ardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release of
hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to
present or future public health or welfare or the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (Supp. IV 1980).
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ble;51  hence, a consistent approach to the interpretation of
CERCLA necessarily would lead to the conclusion that the section
defines those responsible under all liability provisions of the Act.
The imminent hazard section therefore should be considered au-
thority for allowing courts to order any potentially liable party, as
defined by section 107, to abate an imminent hazard in any man-
ner consistent with the rules of equity.
2. Harmonious use of the statutory remedies. Evidence that
CERCLA was to be considered a complement to other environ-
mental statutes and that the various provisions were to be read in
a harmonious manner is indicated by both the Senate report and
the limited explariation of CERCLA given on the floor of the Sen-
ate. Senator Jennings Randolph, Chairman of the Committee on
Environment and Public Works, explained to the members of the
Senate that the Superfund legislation was intended to complement
other environmental laws." For example, when questioned by Sen-
ator Bill Bradley about certain preemptive language in the bill,
Chairman Randolph indicated that any such language was only in-
tended to prohibit states from creating a duplicate fund to pay
damages compensable under CERCLA,5 9 and that it was the spon-
sors' intent that CERCLA's cleanup and containment capacity be
considered an appeal of last resort to be used in the absence of any
other adequate response.60
The Congress addressed the issue of the interaction of the va-
rious statute sections as well. Indeed, Senator Randolph, when ex-
plaining sections of CERCLA to the Senate,6' indicated that the
57. The text of § 107 states only that
1) the owner or operator of a vessel ... or facility,
2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
3) any person who by contract ... or otherwise arranged for disposal...
4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport
... from which there is a release, or a threatened release, shall be liable for-
A) all costs of removal or remedial action. .
B) any other necessary costs of response ... ;
C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
58. 126 CONG. REc. 30,933 (1980).
59. Id. at 30,949.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 30,933.
1983]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
section 106(c)"2 requirement that the Administrator of the EPA
develop guidelines for the use of section 106(a) and other sections
was included for two reasons: "First, existing statutory authority is
often underutilized; second, it reflects ... [the fact] that this leg-
islation creates additional authorities that complement these
laws."' 3 This explanation indicates that Congress did not intend
that section 106(a) be used only when it was the sole available au-
thority, but rather that the section be read and invoked in con-
junction with other available law. Other portions of the Act's legis-
lative history lend support to the notion that the statute is to be
read harmoniously. The Senate report states: "It should in addi-
tion be noted that the legal remedies in this Act are cumulative
and not exclusive. Nothing in this Act requires pursuit of any
claim against the Fund as a condition precedent to any other legal
right. '6 4 This language is a clear indication that remedies other
than the use of the Fund are available, and that the Fund is to be
used only as a remedy of last resort.
Analysis of the various sections of CERCLA similarly reveals a
varied approach to solving the problems caused by hazardous
waste. CERCLA sets forth a mechanism to accomplish disposal
site cleanup in section 104 of the Act. This section enables the ex-
ecutive branch to implement a wide range of measures to provide
for waste removal and remedial action. 5 The government's author-
62. Section 106(c) states that the EPA shall "establish and publish guidelines for using
the imminent hazard, enforcement, and emergency response authorities of this section...
to effectuate the responsibilities and powers created by this Act." 42 U.S.C. § 9606(c) (Supp.
IV 1980).
63. 126 CONG. REc. 30,933 (1980).
64. S. REP. No. 848, supra note 47, at 83.
65. Section 104(a)(1) provides the authority for the president to
act, consistent with the national contingency plan, to remove or arrange for the
removal of and provide for remedial action. . . or take any other response mea-
sure. . . necessary to protect the public health. . . unless the President deter-
mines that such removal and remedial action will be done properly by the owner
or operator . . . or by any other responsible party.
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). Section 105 of CERCLA mandates the creation of
the national contingency plan to be used under § 104. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (Supp. IV 1980).
Hazardous substance is defined in the Act as:
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of title 33, (B)
any element, compound, mixture, solution or substance designated pursuant to
section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics
identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal
Act (42 U.S.C. 6921) (but not including any waste the regulation of which ...
has been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under
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ity is limited, however, by the fact that it must first determine
whether any responsible party will assume the costs for the
cleanup without government intervention.6 Similarly, a limitation
on the government's power to take remedial action exists under
section 104.67 While it is empowered to commence such steps as are
necessary, the executive branch's ability to act is restricted by stat-
ute should the individual states choose not to cooperate in the fed-
eral government's effort." This mechanism prevents the federal
government from removing toxic waste from a dangerous site if the
state provides no alternative disposal area.
Section 106(a), however, does not contain the stringent limit-
ing conditions which may preclude the use of section 104. Section
106(a) empowers the executive branch to "require the Attorney
General of the United States to secure such relief as may be neces-
sary to abate"6 9 an imminent hazard. In order to invoke the use of
section 106(a), the EPA must only determine that "there may be
an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health
... because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stance .... ,,70 Thus, this section provides the government with
authority to secure relief in situations where the stringent condi-
tions of section 104 are not met. The different limiting conditions
for use of the respective sections, along with the congressional in-
tent as evinced from the legislative history, clearly support the
contention that possible use of section 104 does not bar use of sec-
tion 106(a).
section 1317(a) of title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under section
112 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7412) and (F) any imminently hazardous
chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has
taken action pursuant to section 2606 of title 15 ....
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (Supp. IV 1980). See also supra notes 55-56.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
68. Subsection 104(c)(3) states that the president shall not provide remedial action un-
less the state in which the release occurs enters into a contract assuring future maintenance,
the availability of a proper disposal facility, and state payment of ten percent of the cost of
remedial action or at least fifty percent of the response expenditures if the state owned the
site at the time of the hazardous waste disposal. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
Subsection (c)(4) requires that remedial actions be "cost-effective." 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(4)
(Supp. IV 1980).




'C. Principles of the Superfund and Possible Problems
Two basic tenets of the Superfund may be gleaned from the
statute's sections and legislative history. Perhaps the most impor-
tant principle for the purpose of a discussion of injunctive relief is
that generators, transporters, and past as well as present site own-
ers are all liable for costs of removal or remedial action. 1 The stat-
ute specifically declines to distinguish between on-site and off-site
generators, and between past owners and present owners. Liability
is statutorily conferred by section 10772 upon all these parties, at
least when section 104 is used.73 Arguably, section 107's mandate
applies to section 106(a) actions as well. 4
A second underlying directive of CERCLA is that responsible
parties should pay for cleanups whenever possible; the Fund is in-
tended to be used only when responsible parties are unidentifiable
or without funds. 5 This underlying policy is expressed in the stat-
ute by the proviso that the government shall provide removal and
remedial action unless such action will be undertaken by a respon-
sible party.76 The Act also provides that claims must be made to
responsible parties, that court actions may be commenced before
the Fund is used," and that the President may secure injunctive
relief and issue orders. 9 Any liable party who fails to act upon a
presidential order will become liable for punitive damages.80 Taken
together, these statute sections set up a statutory mechanism
which provides the executive branch with authority to order and
enforce orders so that responsible parties initially pay for the
cleanup; those responsible parties by definition include any and all
of those whose actions created the danger.
While the above mentioned principles are clearly illustrated in
71. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 94-106 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 9612(a) (Supp. IV 1980) (stating that "claims ... shall be presented
. . . to the owner, operator, or guarantor of the vessel or facility from which a hazardous
substance has been released, if known to the claimant, and to any other person known to
the claimant who may be liable under section 9607 ..
78. 42 U.S.C. § 9612(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(b), 9607(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
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both the statutory language and the legislative history of
CERCLA, 81 some difficulties exist with the implementation of
these principles through the use of sections 104 and 107. Fortu-
nately, use of section 106(a) provides a solution to some of these
problems.
One problem in implementing a cleanup through the use of
the Superfund is the fact that the fund is limited."2 Not all clean-
ups, regardless of necessity, can be undertaken by the government.
This problem was recognized by Congress and led to the inclusion
of section 111(e) under which claims are to be paid in full in the
order of final determination, should the total claims be greater
than the balance of the Fund. 3 Similarly, Congress felt it neces-
sary to formulate a list of top priority sites8 from which fact it can
be reasonably inferred that the legislature itself recognized the
limited nature of the Fund. In practice, sites not on this list have
little chance of being cleaned up through use of Fund monies.
Aware of the limitations of the Fund, Congress also provided
the mechanism by which responsible parties should be ordered to
provide the cleanup;8 5 compliance therewith is encouraged through
the threat of punitive damages.8 6 The availability of 'funds is still a
concern, however, because the government must commence a civil
suit to recover these punitive damages; CERCLA funds still are
necessary to initially remedy the hazard. 7 Thus, by using sections
104 and 107, the scenario exists in which a hazard of great magni-
tude is present, but only limited and inadequate funds are availa-
ble for remedial action.
The second difficulty in implementing a cleanup action
through the use of the Fund relates to the necessity of state action.
As enunciated in section 104(c)(3),8 8 the President may not provide
any remedial action unless the state agrees to accept certain re-
81. See supra notes 48-70 and accompanying text.
82. The Act creates a $1.6 billion Fund; however, estimates indicate that from $26.2 to
$44.1 billion will be needed to clean up potentially dangerous sites. Hazardous Waste Hear-
ings pt.4, supra note 23, at 37-38.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(e) (Supp. IV 1980).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(8)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
85. 42 U.S.C § 9606(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
86. 42 U.S.C § 9607(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
87. Id.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
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sponsibilities a9 This proposition does not auger well for remedial
cleanup because past hazardous waste difficulties at times have
elicited something less than cooperative, concerned help from state
and local officials.9 Of course, removal actions such as evacuation
of threatened individuals and security fencing may still be author-
ized,9 1 but other measures involving the cleanup cannot be under-
taken. Thus, a situation might develop where, because of the in-
ability of a state government to cooperate, the hazard from a waste
site leads to evacuation, but Superfund monies are not available
for general cleanup action.92 Migration of waste would continue
89. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
90. Indeed, Michael Brown, in LAYING WAsTE, discusses several instances where govern-
ment officials have hampered private individuals' efforts to expose practices of chemical
generators. Some state officials feel they are faced with a dilemma of trading off jobs for
health. This sentiment was expressed by Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards: "We've made
tradeoffs, accomodations, compromises, if you will. Need for jobs, industrial development,
and stimulation for our economy justify temporary tradeoffs, in some instances some serious
tradeoffs. We did what we thought was the best for the people and the economy of Louisi-
ana." M. BROWN, supra note 1, at 166.
91. Removal actions and remedial actions are considered two distinct areas of reaction
to hazardous waste emergency. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text
92. The inability of state governments to meet the cost burden which CERCLA places
on local government has materialized already. For example, the inability of local govern-
ment in Seymour, Indiana, to allocate the funds necessary to receive Superfund assistance
was one factor which led to the possibly inadequate settlement agreed to by 24 companies
and the government. These companies agreed to provide $7.7 million for the cleanup of
60,000 leaking drums containing cyanide, C-56, naphthalene, phenol, arsenic and PCBs. The
Seymour Recycling site had been originally leased from the town in 1969. In 1976 the re-
cycling company, which had stockpiled waste at the site, was sold to the Environmental
Processing Corp. Environmental Processing abandoned the site in 1980; the corporation was
declared bankrupt. N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1983, at B12, col. 1.
In the Seymour case, the municipality owned the land; under CERCLA § 104(c)(3) the
state therefore would be required to provide 50% of the response costs. 42 U.S.C. §
9604(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). In this instance, matching funds were not available. N.Y. Times,
Mar. 3, 1983, at B12, col. 4.
Similar financial difficulties plagued Illinois in its quest to clean the Waukegan River
when CERCLA was enacted; Illinois hoped to be able to use Superfund money for its
cleanup. "Governor James Thompson and his staff concluded that because of budget con-
straints the money [10% of the total cost of the cleanup] could not be obtained from the
Legislature." N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1983, at A14, coL 4. In this instance the major polluter,
Outboard Marine Corp., later was sued under CERCLA § 106(a). United States v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
The EPA appears to be quite aware that the state funding requirement is a serious im-
pediment to cleanups. N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1983, at A7, col. 4 (recounting testimony of
William N. Hedeman, Jr., director of the EPA toxic waste cleanup program, at a hearing of
the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, where Mr. Hedeman noted that
"the requirement of the law that the State pay 10 percent of cleanup costs was in many
instances a major obstacle").
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until an even greater hazard exists. Use of section 106(a), rather
than section 104, may be a viable alternative in this case in order
to "secure such relief as may be necessary to abate the danger or
threat.... .," Relying specifically on the authority to abate public
hazards, section 106(a) provides a means by which the government
may at least ensure that responsible parties act to prevent the
most serious threats, such as the migration of chemicals into
groundwater, e4 even if the section cannot be used to authorize full
removal and remedial action.
The discussion above demoilstrates that section 106(a) must
be read in conjunction with the other sections of CERCLA, and
that the use of section 106(a) is necessary to fully effectuate the
principles and policies of the Act. For the Act's policies to be im-
plemented, the imminent hazard provision must be construed
broadly. Section 106(a) should be available even when alternative
methods of action are possible, and the section should be read in
harmony with section 107's mandate concerning liability.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 106(A)
While the legislative history suggests that Congress intended a
broad construction of section 106(a), judicial interpretations of the
section have not always viewed the imminent hazard provision in
this manner. For example, a more restrictive construction was as-
signed to the imminent hazard provision in United States v.
Wade.e" In Wade, Judge Newcomer, district court judge for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, was presented with a motion to
dismiss the federal government's cause of action arising under
CERCLA section 106(a). Judge Newcomer considered the motion
93. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
94. Possible groundwater contamination by chemicals leaching from a hazardous waste
disposal site is one of the major problems associated with these sites. Groundwater is water
that lies buried "from a few feet to a half mile or more beneath the land's surface in stretch-
es of permeable rock, sand and gravel known as aquifers." The Poisoning of America, supra
note 24, at 66. Groundwater is almost impossible to purify once it has been chemically pol-
luted because "[g]roundwater is not exposed to the natural purification systems that recycle
and cleanse surface water; there is no sunlight, for example, to evaporate it and thereby
remove salts and other minerals and chemicals. Nor can groundwater be counted upon to
clean itself as it moves through the earth, for it scarcely 'flows' at alL" Id. at 66. According
to Eckardt C. Beck, former EPA Assistant Administrator for Water and Waste Manage-
ment, "[g]roundwater can take a human lifetime just to traverse a mile. Once it becomes
polluted, the contamination can last for decades." Id. at 66.
95. 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982), appeal dismissed, 713 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1983).
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as raising a narrow issue: whether CERCLA section 106(a) could
be used to confer liability "upon the defendants... , non-negli-
gent off-site generators of hazardous waste for past disposal of
such waste which now creates an imminent hazard."' O After con-
sidering the language of the statute and the applicable legislative
history, the judge determined that non-negligent off-site genera-
tors of hazardous waste who are not currently dumping are not
proper defendants under section 106(a).
9 7
The court's holding is based upon several suspect conclusions:
that sections 104 and 107 should be used because they constitute
an adequate remedy at law;98 that off-site generators are not the
correct class of defendant;99 and that section 106(a), because it is
written in the present tense, is not to be used for hazards caused
by past dumping.100 The rationale used to support these questiona-
ble conclusions illustrates the problems encountered when at-
tempting to discern the proper use of section 106(a). The court's
reasoning, therefore, must be explored further.
Central to the court's opinion was the belief that the govern-
ment should attempt to recover from past generators under sec-
tions 104 and 107, rather than under section 106(a). The court
noted that the heart of CERCLA is contained in section 104, which
gives the EPA authority to undertake emergency cleanup mea-
sures, and that section 107, working in tandem with section 104,
clearly applies to past generators. 01 Thus, Judge Newcomer con-
cluded that sections 104 and 107 provide for a remedy at law, and
that section 106(a), providing for an action in equity, could not be
applied. That the government would be required to pay for the
cleanup first under these sections, according to the court, simply
reflected the will of Congress. 0 2 The fact that section 106(a) does
96. Wade, 546 F. Supp. at 788.
97. Id. at 793-94.
98. Id. at 794 (noting that § 104 and § 107 clearly set forth the mechanism for site
cleanup and for recovery of costs from responsible parties; § 106(a), according to the court,
is a complement to these main sections).
99. Id. at 792 (noting that the government urged the court to interpret CERCLA §
106(a) as analogous to RCRA § 7003). The court held that under § 7003 off-site generators
are not the correct class of defendant. Id. at 791.
100. Id. at 794.
101. Id. at 793.
102. The court noted that the purpose and method of implementing the statute were
clearly indicated by the House of Representatives. Id. at 793 n.20, (citing H.R. REP. No. 96-
1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 17) reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6119,
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not state that it is an alternative mechanism to section 104 was
also relied on by the court in support of its conclusion.
In fact, Judge Newcomer went so far as to speculate about the
underlying reason for the government's decision to pursue a sec-
tion 106(a) claim.1 03 Since the Superfund is not large enough to
remedy the hazardous waste problem fully, the court viewed the
government's section 106(a) action as an attempt to force genera-
tors to put forth the funds for the cleanup so that government
money would not be expended. 104 Judge Newcomer contended that
using section 106(a) for this purpose would be tantamount to judi-
cial legislation.10 5 The court rejected as contrary to legislative in-
tent the government's contention that the sections be read harmo-
niously, an interpretation which would allow a choice of methods
for addressing the problems of abandoned sites. Judge Newcomer
concluded that "[w]here Congress . . .has clearly designated its
choice,"110 it is the duty of the court to follow that legislative
intent.
The Wade court also concluded that off-site past generators
should not be included as defendants in a section 106(a) action.
Noting that the statute section "authorizes the government to seek
immediate injunctive relief because of 'an actual or threatened re-
lease of a hazardous substance from a facility,' "1107 Judge New-
comer concluded that section 106(a) therefore is only applicable
where waste is being discharged currently or threatened to be dis-
charged from a facility, and "where such discharge could be
stopped by an injunction." 10 8 This questionable reading of section
106(a) would restrict its applicability to those same situations cov-
6119-20 (1980).
103. The court noted that "astonishingly" the government had pursued action under §
106(a) rather than § 107. Wade, 546 F. Supp. at 787, 793 n.22.
104. Id. at 793 n.22.
105. Id. at 794.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. "Facility" is defined in CERCLA § 101(9) as:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline. . . well,
pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle,
rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has
been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located;
but does not include any consumer product in consumer use .
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (Supp. IV 1980).
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ered under section 7003 of RCRA. 09 The court does not address
the fact that CERCLA was enacted in order to allow government
action where RCRA is inapplicable.
Finally, the court considered that an injunction could be
granted only to restrain a party. "Since the complaint does not al-
lege that any of the generators is currently disposing of waste on
the Wade site or that there is any threat that they will resume
their past practice of doing so, [the court] . . . cannot sensibly
grant the government's prayer that they be permanently restrained
. ". . .3 The court rejected the notion that a court can "'enjoin'
the defendant among others, to pay for the cost of... implement-
ing a plan to clean up the Wade site."' Citing two decisions
which denied injunctive relief when such relief was arguably simi-
lar to money damages, Jaffee v. United States 12 and United
States v. Price,11 s the court concluded that an injunction which
would force the defendants to pay money is not a proper use of
injunctive relief.
114
Thus, Wade discussed two critical issues surrounding the use
of section 106(a): 1) who are the possible defendants (present own-
ers only or past generators also), and 2) can an injunction be
granted to force a cleanup or force payment for a cleanup (i.e., is
an injunction precluded if there is an alternative remedy and is a
mandatory injunction which requires monetary payment a proper
form of injunctive relief). Since Wade, other courts have consid-
ered the use of section 106(a). 5 These cases, as well as the recent
109. For a discussion of the distinction between § 106(a) and RCRA § 7003, see infra
text accompanying notes 117-20.
110. Wade, 546 F. Supp. at 792.
111. Id.
112. 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979).
113. 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
114. In Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3rd Cir. 1979), the court ruled that a
"plaintiff cannot transform a claim for damages into an equitable action by asking for an
injunction that orders the payment of money." Id. at 715. In that case, however, a U.S.
Army soldier had asked for a preliminary injunction requiring the government to pay medi-
cal expenses to treat his inoperable cancer. He contended that he developed cancer by fol-
lowing orders and standing in an open field where he was exposed to radiation without his
knowledge or consent. The court denied the request for a preliminary injunction because it
was actually for a traditional form of damages in tort. Hence, it was not a proper subject for
equitable relief. Id. at 715.
115. United States v. Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982) and United States
v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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circuit court of appeals decision of United States v. Price,1 6
strongly suggest that the conclusions of the Wade court are incor-
rect. Consideration of these courts' views regarding the possible
defendants to a section 106(a) action and the use of mandatory
injunctions provides an explanation of the reason why the Wade
decision concerning CERCLA 106(a) is inappropriate.
A. Possible Defendants
In holding that non-owners could not be considered responsi-
ble parties under CERCLA's imminent hazard provision, the Wade
court seized upon the fact that the section is written in the present
tense, as is section 7003 of RCRA.117 Section 7003, which the gov-
ernment argued was also applicable in Wade, empowers the ad-
ministrator of the EPA to bring suit and to stop and restrain im-
mediately persons contributing to hazardous waste disposal. 8
Thus, section 7003 relates to terminating the action of disposing of
waste. Unlike section 7003, section 106(a) is not specifically related
to disposal. Section 106(a) considers "an actual or threatened re-
lease of a hazardous substance ... .",n9 The section is to be used
not to halt disposal, but to prevent release which is defined in
CERCLA as "any spilling, leaking,.., escaping,... [or] leaching
. ,"12o These terms are those commonly used to describe the
spreading and migrating of hazardous waste after it has been
dumped. Thus, the language of section 106(a) is not analogous to
that of section 7003 of RCRA. Section 106(a) is significantly
broader than RCRA section 7003 because it emcompasses releases
occurring from past disposal. Therefore, the Wade holding was
contrary to the proper reading of the statute. Section 106(a) may
be used against parties who are not associated with current dump-
ing, but who contributed to past dumping which is currently en-
dangering the public.
The determination of possible defendents to a CERCLA sec-
tion 106(a) action has been addressed in opinions other than
Wade. In United States v. Reilly Tar,121 a Minnesota federal dis-
116. 688 F.2d at 204.
117. 546 F. Supp. at 794.
118. See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. IV 1980).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 9061(22).
121. 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982).
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trict court was called upon to determine whether a prior disposal
site owner who was no longer linked to the site was subject to an
order for injunctive relief. The plaintiffs alleged that Reilly Tar
spilled, leaked and discharged chemical wastes into the ground.
These chemicals leached into groundwater linked to the drinking
water system for parts of the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan
area. As a result of the chemical contamination from the dumping
at the Reilly Tar site, in 1978 and 1979 the city of St. Louis Park,
Minnesota, closed five drinking water wells. 2 2 At the time of the
request for injunctive relief, these chemicals, many of which are
potential carcinogens, were continuing to contaminate the ground-
water of the area.
123
On a motion to dismiss a government claim under section
106(a), defendant Reilly Tar contended that the section does not
apply to prior owners of inactive sites. The court, in denying the
motion, disagreed. This conclusion centered upon two facts: 1) the
language of CERCLA contains no limitations on the classes of per-
sons within its reach; and 2) the imminent hazard provision grants
the courts broad equitable powers. Unlike the Wade court, Judge
Magnuson in Reilly Tar concluded that since section 106(a) con-
tains no specific limitation as to the classes of persons within its
reach, there is no reason why injunctive relief cannot be sought
against any class of responsible persons regardless of whether the
acts were committed in the past or present.124 Furthermore, noting
that the statute confers broad equitable powers, the court consid-
ered itself empowered to grant any relief required by the public
122. Id. at 1105-06.
123. Among the chemicals found at the site were the waste products from the refining
of coal tar into creosote oil and other waste products resulting from the treatment of wood
products with creosote oil. These products were either neutral oils, tar acids or tar base. Id.
at 1106. They included flouranthene, acenaphthene, benzopyrene, benzatbracene, pyrene,
and chrysene along with other polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons, phenolic compounds
such as phenol and cresols, and nitrogen compounds such as acridines and naphtlamines. Id.
Creosote oil is a known carcinogen. It is easily absorbed through the skin or through the
intestinal tract. Acute exposure to this chemical can cause vomiting, vertigo, respiratory
difficulties, headaches, convulsions, and possible hypertension. Many waste products from
the creation of creosote oil also produce a synergistic effect when incorporated into the body
with other chemicals. These compounds are considered carcinogens and will enhance the
carcinogenic activity of caucer-causing substances. Phenolic compounds for tar acids may
also cause vomiting, paralysis, convulsions, coma and death. Phenol is also a tumor pro-
moter; it enhances the tumor-forming ability -of certain carcinogens. Id.
124. Id. at 1113.
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interest and the equities of the case. The "variety of response ac-
tions available to the EPA under CERCLA and elsewhere, suggest
that Congress intended to provide the EPA with flexibility to tailor
response actions to fit the circumstances of the individual case. 1 2 25
The court thus considered both the statutory language and the leg-
islative history; Judge Magnuson determined that section 106(a)
must be broadly construed to assure effective use against all re-
sponsible parties.
More recently, the district court of the Northern District of
Illinois had the opportunity to consider the use of section 106(a)
with the guidance of the recently published opinions of Wade and
Reilly Tar. In United States v. Outboard Marine Corp.,126 the
court held that section 106(a) was to be given the broad reach
which the Minnesota district court applied in Reilly Tar.
The Illinois district court noted that section 106(a) does not
indicate specifically who may be sued or enjoined or what one must
do to be subject to suit or injunction. Judge Getzendanner dis-
cussed the difficulty of this perplexing situation, stating:
This court is hesitant to rely only on 'the public interest and the equities of
the case' in determining the reach of section 106(a). Recourse to the federal
common law of nuisance seems to be foreclosed by Milwaukee II. On the
other hand, Congress included this imminent hazard authority in its
CERCLA design, and it should be given effect.'27
Since section 107 indicates that the defendant is within the class
which Congress intended to hold responsible, the court concluded
that it is probable that those who would be liable under section
107 were intended to be liable under section 106(a) as well.12
125. Id. at 1114. The court also noted that the EPA on May 13, 1982, had promulgated
guidelines for using the imminent hazard, enforcement, and emergency response authorities
of section 106(a), as Congress had mandated in section 106(c). "The guidelines state that
the particular authority or authorities to be used, and whether to precede court action with
administrative action, will be determined on a case-by-case basis depending upon the most
effective approach for achieving the desired site cleanup." Id. (citing 47 Fed. Reg. 20,664
(1982)).
126. 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1982). The court in fact notes that the Wade decision
had been brought to its attention. The court rejects the notion that Wade is controlling,
appeals from: "(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States ... refus-
ing or dissolving injunct here and by the district court in Reilly Tar." Id. at 58 n.3.
127. Id. at 57. The court's statement concerning "Milwaukee IF' refers to Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (enactment of Federal Water Pollution Control Act
supplants any previous federal common law remedy). See Dore, supra note 31, at 261.
128. 556 F. Supp. at 57.
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Therefore, after consideration of the legislative history, the lan-
guage of the statute, and judicial interpretation of the Act, the
court concluded that section 106(a) should be broadly construed.
Thus, decisions other than Wade have taken into account the
congressional admonition that "those responsible for problems
caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and re-
sponsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created. ' 129
After considering both a straightforward reading of the statute and
the opinion of the Wade court, both the Illinois and the'Minnesota
federal district courts concluded that "[t]he statute should not be
narrowly interpreted to frustrate the government's ability to re-
spond promptly and effectively, or to limit the liability of those
responsible .... ."11o All those who are classified as liable under
section 107 of CERCLA are possible defendants in a section 106(a)
action.
B. Injunctive Relief to Abate an Imminent Hazard
The second question regarding section 106(a) actions is
whether the section may be used to grant a mandatory injunction
even though the use of section 104 is available. The Wade court
considered this question, and determined that injunctive relief was
inappropriate both because sections 104 and 107, in combination,
provided an alternative method of remedy, and because a grant of
injunctive relief in this instance would be equivalent to ordering
money damages.
These reasons for finding against the use of injunctive relief
relate to basic doctrines concerning the use of this "extraordinary
remedy."1"1 Injunctive relief, an action in equity, may be ordered
at the court's discretion. 3 2 To determine whether this relief should
be granted, several factors must be weighed:
(1) the probability of irreparable injury to the moving party in
the absence of relief;
(2) the possibility of harm to the non-moving party if relief is
granted;
129. Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1112.
130. Id. See also Outboard Marine, 546 F.Supp. at 57.
131. Other remedies do not "offer the speed or the efficiency of judicial intervention for
the protection of a public interest as does an injunction." State v. O.K. Transfer Co., 215 Or.
8, 18, 330 P.2d 510, 514 (1958).
132. See Stokes v. Williams, 226 F. 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1915).
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(3) the likelihood of success on the merits; and
(4) the public interest.
133
It is also a well recognized principle that injunctions will not be
granted where there is a remedy at law which is complete and ade-
quate. 34 The Wade court, in determining that sections 104 and
107 should be used, essentially concluded that these sections con-
stitute an adequate remedy; therefore, injunctive relief could not
be granted.
Nonetheless, the adequate remedy restriction is not without
exception. Particularly when a statute authorizes injunctive relief,
the requirement may be withdrawn.3 5 When a statute provides for
injunctive relief but says nothing about an adequate remedy at law
requirement, the adequate remedy proviso is eliminated from con-
sideration.' 6 Similarly, where a statute specifically authorizes an
agency to sue for injunctive relief, it is not necessary for that
agency to show that it has no alternative means at its disposal.
1 37
Even where the adequate remedy provision is enforced, the mere
existence of a legal remedy is not sufficient to defeat the action."
For the legal remedy to be considered adequate it must be as prac-
tical and efficient towards justice as would be injunctive relief.18
Irreparable injury should be prevented. Since the use of sections
104 and 107 involves claims procedures and state agreements,140
133. Goldhaber v. Foley, 519 F. Supp. 466, 473 (E.D. Pa. 1981). See also A. 0. Smith
Corp. v. F.T.C., 530 F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1976).
134. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 24, 27-34, 57-62 (1973). See also W. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF
MODERN EQUITY 31 (2d ed. 1956); H. MCCLNTOCK, EQUITY 395-96, 426-39 (2d ed. 1948).
135. See UV Indus., Inc. v. Posner, 466 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Me. 1979) ('[w]ere... a
statute provides for injunctive relief upon the showing of a violation, the party seeking such
relief need not make a showing of irreparable harm in the normal equity sense"). Id. at
1255. See also United States v. Spectro Foods Corp., 544 F.2d 1175, 1181 (3d Cir. 1976); Cox
v. Cox, 84 Idaho 513, 373 P.2d 929 (1962); Goble v. New World Life Ins. Co., 57 Idaho 516,
67 P.2d 280 (1937); Conway v. Mississippi State Bd. of Health, 252 Miss. 315, 173 So. 2d 412
(1965).
136. 42 Am. JuR. 2D Injunctions § 38 (Supp. 1983).
137. Bowles v. Barde Steel Co., 177 Or. 421, 482, 164 P.2d 692, 717 (1945). This elimi-
nation of the irreparable harm factor is based upon the notion that suits by the government
are suits undertaken in the public interest. See Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944)
("standards of the public interest, not the requirements of private litigation, measure the
priority and need for injunctive relief. . ."). See also Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206
U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (where a sovereign state or nation is party plaintiff, "it is somewhat
more certainly entitled to specific relief than a private party might be").
138. 42 AM. JuR. 2D Injunctions § 39 (Supp. 1983).
139. Id.
140. See generally supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
1983] 813
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
and the delays attendant therewith, where an imminent threat ex-
ists, this remedy is not sufficiently expedient. Therefore, the ade-
quate remedy proviso to the granting of injunctive relief is not a
bar to the use of the imminent hazard provision of CERCLA.
The second argument the Wade court accepted was that an
injunction, as requested by the government, would be equivalent to
an action at law. The court concluded that the government essen-
tially was seeking monetary damages. 14 1 Recently, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit, in United States v. Price,142 considered
the same question when faced with a claim for injunctive relief
under RCRA section 7003. The district court in this case 143 gave
the impression that injunctive relief could not require the expendi-
ture of money because, the court believed, it would be equivalent
to an action for damages. Since compensatory damages are an ac-
tion at law, the district court concluded that damages could not be
granted in equity.1' The court of appeals, while affirming the
lower court's decision, disagreed with its characterization of the
claim request as one for damages, and concluded that injunctive
relief encompassed orders directing parties to pay monies owed.
The Third Circuit stated that an action requiring the expendi-
ture of money is not necessarily equivalent to an action for dam-
ages since "[d]amages are awarded as a form of substitutional re-
dress. They are intended to compensate . . . ."'5 Noting that in
the case before the court the money expenditure would be for pre-
ventative measures rather than for compensation, the court stated
that where money is used for "the first step in the remedial process
of abating an existing but growing toxic hazard which, if left un-
checked, will result in even graver future injury. . . ,,,4 it is not a
traditional form of damages. In essence, the court reasoned that
forcing a party to pay money to correct a hazardous condition is
equivalent to ordering that party to clean up the waste site itself.
The latter mandate is a more traditional action in equity.
The claims made in Wade, Reilly Tar, and Outboard Marine,
141. Wade, 546 F. Supp. at 792.
142. Price, 688 F.2d at 204.
143. 523 F. Supp. at 1055.
144. Id. at 1067-68.
145. 688 F.2d at 212.
146. Id.
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as well as in Price, are for mandatory,147 rather than prohibitory,
injunctions. The purpose of both a mandatory injunction and a re-
straining injunction is not to correct a past wrong, but to prevent
further injury.14 8 Mandatory injunctions, however, can compel af-
firmative performance which may require the expenditure of
money. 49 The use of a mandatory injunction is appropriate partic-
ularly when the status quo is a condition of action rather than of
rest.150 Where inaction will cause the irreparable injury intended to
be prevented and where the complainant's right to relief is clear
and certain,15  courts of equity should grant mandatory
injunctions.
52
The court of appeals in United States v. Price concluded that
imminent threats from hazardous waste disposal present the types
of situations where mandatory injunctions are appropriate.
The facts of the present case show clearly that the status quo is a condition
of action which, if allowed to continue or proceed unchecked and unre-
strained, will inflict serious irreparable injury. Therefore, a mandatory pre-
147. Mandatory injunctions allow for the compulsion of some positive act in order to
restore the status quo. See generally 42 AM. Jum. 2D Injunctions § 16 (Supp. 1983).
148. E.g., United Bonding Ins. Co. v. Stein, 410 F.2d 483, 486 (3d Cir. 1969); United
States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1968); United Parcel Serv. Inc. v. Local 25 of
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 421 F. Supp. 452, 459 (D. Mass. 1976); Knutson v. Daily Review,
Inc., 383 F. Supp. 1346, 1388 (N.D. Cal. 1974), modified, 401 F. Supp. 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1975);
Gilmore v. James, 274 F. Supp. 75 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd, 389 U.S. 572 (1974); United States v.
Packorp, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 963, 965 (W.D. Mich. 1965); Brooks v. Tallahassee, 202 F. Supp.
57, 58 (N.D. Fla. 1961).
149. E.g., Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Northside Belt Ry. Co., 276 U.S. 475 (1928). See also
United Steelworkers of America v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting, 598 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1979);
United States v. Whiting Milk Co., 21 F. Supp. 321 (D. Mass. 1937), aff'd sub nom. H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 97 F.2d 677 (1st Cir. 1938), aft'd, 307 U.S. 588 (1939).
"Mandatory injunctions affirmatively compelling the doing of some act, rather than merely
negatively forbidding continuation of a course of conduct, are a traditional tool of equity."
Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 590 (5th Cir. 1962).
150. E.g., Toledo, A.A. & N.M. Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 F. 730, 741 (C.C.N.D.
Ohio 1893).
151. See Green v. Messer, 243 Ala. 405, 10 So. 2d 157 (1942); Alabama Power Co. v.
Guntersville, 236 Ala. 503, 183 S. 396 (1938); Moss Indus. v. Irving Metal Co., 140 N.J. Eq.
484, 55 A.2d 30 (1947).
152. The Toledo court described a preliminary injunction's purpose to be:
to preserve the status quo until, upon final hearing, the court may grant full
relief. Generally this can be accomplished by an injunction prohibitory in form,
but it sometimes happens that the status quo is a condition not of rest, but of
action, and the condition of rest is exactly what will inflict the irreparable injury
upon complainant.... In such a case courts of equity issue mandatory writs
before the case is heard on its merits.
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liminary injunction designed to prevent that injury would [be] appropriate.
A preliminary injunction designed to prevent an irreparable injury is
conceptually distinct from a claim for damages. 15 3
Thus, both the legislative history of CERCLA and case law on
mandatory injunctions as a remedy indicate that an injunction can
be granted in claims such as that considered in Wade. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that the grant of this injunctive relief re-
mains at the discretion of the district court judge. 1'5 The decision
may be overturned only if the district court has abused its discre-
tion, committed an obvious error in applying the law, or made a
serious mistake in considering the proof.' 55 Therefore, while in-
junctive relief is available to abate an imminent threat to the pub-
lic health, whether or not this relief should be granted is a policy
decision to be decided by balancing the factors relevant to equita-
ble relief. The circumstances 156 surrounding the imminent hazard
thus will be crucial in determining the appropriate relief to be
granted.
CONCLUSION
Coping with past hazardous waste disposal is and will continue
to be a major concern for both the EPA and the courts. Congress
enacted CERCLA to provide the EPA with both the authority and
the mechanism to secure relief from dangers to the public health.
Congress intended that those responsible for the production of
these health hazards be held liable for their abatement, and that
the Superfund be used as a last recourse.
Section 106(a) was enacted to provide the EPA with a means
by which this congressional mandate could be fulfilled. In Wade,
153. Price, 688 F.2d at 212.
154. Id. at 210 (citing Stokes v. Williams, 226 F. 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1915)).
155. E.g., A.O. Smith Co. v. F.T.C., 530 F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1976); Kennecott Corp. v.
Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs., Inc., 630
F.2d 120, 136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014 (1980).
156. These circumstances should be considered in light of the factors listed supra text
accompanying note 133. Of course the court's action should be controlled by congressional
intent in enacting CERCLA. See Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
When Congress entrusts to an equity court the enforcement of prohibitions con-
tained in a regulatory enactment, it must be taken to have acted cognizant of the
historic power of equity to provide complete relief in light of the statutory pur-
poses. As this Court long ago recognized, "there is inherent in the Courts of
Equity a jurisdiction to ... give effect to the policy of the legislature."
Id. at 291 (citing Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. 195, 203 (1938)).
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the court frustrated the EPA's efforts through an erroneous read-
ing of congressional intent. More recent decisions, however, have
correctly held that injunctive relief under section 106(a) is availa-
ble to abate hazards from toxic waste disposal. Based upon the
congressional intent as well as the fact that mandatory injunctions
can be granted which require money expenditures, these courts
have concluded that the EPA should be provided with the flex-
ibility and variety of legal approaches necessary for the successful
cleanup of toxic waste sites. This avenue of recourse is certain to
be both useful and necessary in the future as the nation struggles
to come to grips with its toxic waste dilemma.
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